Biblical Law and the Making of England: Vol. 3 John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
Law makes nations and biblical law – and reactions to it – has determinatively shaped the making of modern England.
The Liberal Philosopher: John Locke (1632 – 1704)
The opening chapter of this volume explores John Locke’s use of biblical law in his political philosophy, particularly in his Two Treatises of Government. The “Father of Liberalism” integrates biblical law into his arguments for liberty, equality, natural rights, private property, and government by consent. Locke’s approach to biblical law emerges from his critique of Sir Robert Filmer’s defence of monarchical absolutism and patriarchy, which Filmer bases on biblical texts, particularly Genesis. In the First Treatise, Locke argues that Filmer misinterprets the Bible and seeks to systematically dismantle Filmer’s claims. Contrary to Filmer, Locke reinterprets Genesis 1:27-28 as granting dominion to all humanity (and not just to Adam); Genesis 3:16 as applying only to conjugal relationships (and not to political authority), and Exodus 20:12 as concerning familial respect rather than political sovereignty. In this way, Locke argues, biblical law supports human freedom and equality, not subjugation.
Scholars often assume Locke’s use of the Bible and biblical law is compatible with his political philosophy. However, Chapter One argues that a closer exegesis reveals Locke’s selective and sometimes inconsistent handling of biblical texts. Although Locke’s standard for biblical interpretation – as he applies it to Filmer – emphasises clarity, consistency, and the interpretation of Scripture by Scripture, Locke himself frequently departs from these principles. In these respects, Locke’s biblical usage is primarily instrumental rather than foundational. While he successfully challenged Filmer’s monarchical absolutism on the basis of Scripture, his own political theory relies more on rational thinking and his own ideas about natural law than biblical authority. Taken together, then, The Two Treatises provide evidence that biblical law ultimately resists manipulation for political ends. Integrating Scripture with political philosophy has both possibilities and limits. Locke’s work demonstrates that while biblical texts can be discussed rationally, they cannot be easily bent to serve predetermined political agendas without creating interpretive tensions. Yet for all his shortcomings, Locke was right to see political freedom and human equality as being ordained in Scripture and to insist that government must be based on reason. The chapter concludes by asking: if Locke’s putative use of biblical law was powerful and lasting enough to help to establish the modern political consensus, what might a more faithful and comprehensive application achieve?
The Law Reformer: Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832)
Chapter Two explores the role of biblical law in the writings of Jeremy Bentham, the pioneering legal reformer and founder of modern utilitarianism. Bentham’s philosophy, rooted in the principle of utility (and sometimes summarised as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”) was deeply critical of biblical law, which he viewed as antiquated, inconsistent, and incompatible with modern governance. At the same time, he admired certain aspects of biblical law, such as its transparency and effective promulgation. The result is a conflicted relationship.
The chapter details Bentham’s approach to biblical law which he defines as commands delivered by human figures like Moses and Jesus, dismissing its divine origin. The chapter shows how Bentham secularised biblical law, reducing it to a positivist framework of commands, sanctions, and compliance, while ignoring its broader normative complexity. This included its narrative, prophetic, and poetic dimensions. Bentham also criticised the lack of clear distinctions between ceremonial and moral laws in the New Testament. However, his critique stemmed from his own rigid positivist assumptions which failed to grasp narrative and covenantal continuity between the Old and New Testaments.
Despite his hostility, Bentham acknowledged that biblical law exemplified ideals he valued, including transparent justice. He praised certain practices including judicial accountability, the swift resolution of cases, the high level of judicial engagement, the use of intelligible language, the intolerance of bribery and the prohibition of false testimony as being superior to the legal systems of his own time. The same is true in regard to the Benthamite ideal of the effective promulgation of law. This includes the emphasis within biblical law on oral communication, together with the wide dissemination of written law and the internalisation and memorisation of law aligned closely with Bentham’s vision of a rational legal system that served the public, rather than elites. Unfortunately, Bentham failed to consider other aspects of biblical law that aligned with his own values for a just legal system, including the need for morally communicative punishment, linguistic clarity and the use of motivation clauses in legislation.
The chapter contends that Bentham’s ultimate rejection of biblical law was driven by his desire to establish his utilitarian code as the sole governing principle and to admit no rivals. Using biblical language and imagery, some of Bentham’s writings cast himself as a secular Moses – or a messianic figure – who advanced a secular Torah by means of a universal code. This points towards a deeper psychological tension. Bentham saw in biblical law a rival worldview that mirrored his own ambitions, though one that was rooted in divine authority and not human reason. In sum, the chapter shows the various ways in which Bentham’s treatment of biblical law is flawed. The chapter concludes that, although Bentham encapsulates an entire way of thinking about and practicing law that even reflects modern assumptions about biblical law, he consistently misreads and misrepresents the biblical texts. The need, therefore, is to recover a way of thinking about the subject that not only does justice to the biblical texts but also allows them to fertilise modern legal systems, as even Bentham acknowledges they have the power to do.
The Revolutionaries: Karl Marx (1818 – 1883) & Friedrich Engels (1820 – 1895)
Chapter Three explores the relationship between Marx, Engels and biblical law. Influenced by Feuerbach and Strauss, Marx and Engels viewed religion, including biblical law, as a tool of oppression and alienation, consistently associating it with the bourgeoisie, capitalists and their political opponents. Unfortunately, Marx and Engels chose to misrepresent biblical law as supporting the rich and powerful and ignored its emancipatory aspects. This is consistent with how they used the language of biblical law rhetorically to critique their adversaries but failed to engage substantively with its content.
The chapter explores various resonances between Marx and biblical law. Notably, Marx’s critique of fetishism aligns closely with Isaiah’s condemnation of idol-making, with both emphasising the alienation caused by putting misplaced value upon material objects. And although Marx and Engels try to imagine a world without biblical law, even they acknowledge Christianity’s enduring character. They also recognise its revolutionary potential, suggesting that biblical law could have been a valuable resource for their political goals. Later Marxist thinkers, including Anatoly Lunacharsky and Ernst Bloch, did explore the Hebrew Bible’s revolutionary aspects, identifying its democratic virtues and subversive undertones. The chapter argues that there remains a need for Marxism to explore the radicalism of the Pentateuch more fully and systematically. The emphasis within biblical law upon justice, freedom, and social welfare aligns with certain Marxist concerns that Marx and Engels failed to consider.
The chapter goes on to present an alternative genealogical relationship between biblical law and Marxism by showing how biblical law was constructed in such a way as to prevent the development of a system of dominating and dominated social classes. Being rooted in the events of the Exodus, Torah was, among other things, designed to keep Israel free from a hierarchy of permanent and institutionalised stratification. In this way, biblical law embodies a revolutionary ethos that was aimed at maintaining freedom. Securing this included elevating the status of ordinary individuals, limiting the powers of kings and priests, dispersing judicial authority, banning interest, ensuring universal access to land, cancelling debts, protecting workers and providing for the economically marginalised. Contrasting sharply with the hierarchical systems of the ancient Near East, biblical law aims to promote justice, egalitarianism and interdependence. In this way, a constructive engagement with biblical law could have enriched Marx and Engels’s vision of emancipation and offered a framework for social and constitutional reform.
The chapter concludes that Marx and Engels’s prejudice prevented them from recognising biblical law’s potential to address exploitation and inequality and so limited their revolutionary scope. Biblical law remains a powerful testament to liberation, challenging Marx and Engels’s critique and inviting further exploration of its transformative potential.
The book series concludes by highlighting the enduring influence of biblical law on England’s political and legal traditions from the ninth to the nineteenth century. Figures like Alfred the Great, John of Salisbury, Stephen Langton, John Selden and John Locke applied biblical law to advance justice, governmental accountability, and human flourishing. Biblical law inspired cultural renaissances, limited monarchical abuses and shaped foundational documents. Despite highly adverse circumstances, such persons showed its applicability, political realism and compatibility with reason. In many periods and in various ways, biblical law fostered conciliar governance, intellectual inquiry and opposition to tyranny. It provided a framework for limiting arbitrary power and promoted liberty, equality and rights. Unfortunately, modern scholarship downplays and overlooks its contribution. Too often, we have allowed our thinking to be influenced by the flawed exegesis of Hobbes, Bentham, Marx and Engels, each of whom misrepresented biblical law as impractical and alienating.
The book ends by characterising biblical law as the jewel in the crown of good government. When it has sparkled, England has shone. Like a jewel, it is also priceless currency – treasured, abused and misspent throughout England’s history. The book challenges readers to critically examine past misinterpretations and to explore how biblical law can inform contemporary political thought. Ultimately, it underscores the need for interdisciplinary methodologies to rediscover and apply biblical law in the modern era, thus capitalising on its legacy as a cornerstone of justice and societal progress.